![]() ![]() Young Americans whom McNamara sent to Vietnam routinely exhibited more courage than the “brilliant” Secretary of Defense himself. As the Johnson tapes memorialize, the automaton defense secretary was unable to steel himself to share the truth, as he saw it, with the president. The technocrat who would not look to the past for perspective was unable to summon a vision of the future for guidance and inspiration. Along the way, he seemed tragically prone to enabling organizations to move in service of statistics, rather than having statistics put to the service of the organizations’ visions and missions. McNamara sought to bring analytical rigor to public and private bureaucracies. He certainly did not indicate publicly that he was mindful of his duty to serve the American people, or the nation itself as an ongoing, historic enterprise. What is striking is how little he spoke of his own, independent obligation of judgment. Was Johnson’s patronage calculated to maintain McNamara’s silence about his evolving views of the Vietnam war?Įven in his dotage, McNamara sought to evade accountability for his stewardship. Soon enough, McNamara would be ensconced at the World Bank. Johnson, who appears notably less emotionally involved in the moment, has presented him with a Medal of Freedom. He is moved to the point of tears by the praise of President Johnson. One of the chilling scenes of The Fog of War is McNamara’s farewell from the Department of Defense in early 1968. ![]() He appeared oblivious to the need for self-reflection as he rationalized the escalating Kennedy-Johnson administration involvement in Vietnam. As he later acknowledged, he entered the Pentagon with little knowledge of history-and, more importantly, he did not act to fill the gap. Warlord of the Spreadsheetsįor this, McNamara was manifestly unprepared and ill-suited. It was fitting that a portrait of the brilliant, doomed first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, hung prominently behind Secretary McNamara’s desk, inviting comparison.įate would soon enough cast McNamara into an unfamiliar, less congenial role: warlord. McNamara appeared to be an inspired choice to impose civilian control over the sprawling “military-industrial complex.” Perhaps some narrow-minded certainty and even some lack of historical knowledge was required in order to assume the task. McNamara had analyzed the actual effects of strategic bombing generals like Curtis LeMay were able to improve their performance with McNamara’s insights. Each may well have felt he understood lessons lost on his predecessors. They were both of a new generation in Washington, marked by their youthful service in World War II. Kennedy was likely attracted by McNamara’s cocksure ways. The ‘Whiz Kid’ felt he was unqualified for Treasury-but was comfortable assuming a life-and-death decision-making role in the Pentagon. McNamara, a nominal Republican, was offered Treasury or Defense. McNamara rose to the summit of influence at the theretofore cocooned Ford Motor Company, ultimately selected as president by Henry Ford II.įrom there it was a quick, seemingly seamless move into John Kennedy’s New Frontier. After the war, he became part of the surging meritocracy that would transform corporate America. He participated in the Second World War, lending his prodigious talent for statistics to assist in the management of strategic bombing against Germany and Japan. McNamara’s earliest memories include Armistice Day in 1918, marking the emergence of the United States to the heights of international power. Morris is notably effective in presenting the historical context for McNamara’s career. The film examines the life and work of Robert McNamara, architect of the Vietnam War. At the least, each appointee of every new presidential administration might be urged to sit and think their way through this chastening catalog of how one person of great energy and ability can make an extraordinary, tragic difference. On reflection, I would suggest that anyone with leadership or management responsibilities add this film to their must-see list. Without planning it, I’ve fallen into an annual custom of watching Errol Morris’s memorable documentary, The Fog of War. Credit | Yoichi Okamoto, Public Domain via Wikipedia. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, cabinet meeting, February 9, 1968. ![]()
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